Antiviral software systems (AVSs) have problems in detecting polymorphic variants of viruses without specific signatures for such variants. Previous alignment-based approaches for automatic signature extraction have shown how signatures can be generated from consensuses found in polymorphic variant code. Such sequence alignment approaches required variable length viral code to be extended through gap insertions into much longer equal length code for signature extraction through data mining of consensuses. Non-nested generalized exemplars (NNge) are used in this paper in an attempt to further improve the automatic detection of polymorphic variants. The important contribution of this paper is to compare a variable length data mining technique using viral source code to the previously used equal length data mining technique obtained through sequence alignment. This comparison was achieved by conducting three different experiments (i.e. Experiments I-III). Although Experiments I and II generated unique and effective syntactic signatures, Experiment III generated the most effective signatures with an average detection rate of over 93%. The implications are that future, syntactic-based smart AVSs may be able to generate effective signatures automatically from malware code by adopting data mining and alignment techniques to cover for both known and unknown polymorphic variants and without the need for semantic (run-time) analysis.
system such as an AVS, the primary issue is to detect a worm or virus variant that is not stored in its signature database. Modern detection methods are frequently unable to detect new malware variants until they make an appearance even when a signature of one variant of that particular malware is known [1] [2] [3] [4] , because of polymorphism. Such polymorphism usually leaves the payload instructions alone but changes the structure of the malware through modification in the encryption and decryption engines or through reordering of instructions [1] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Polymorphism is typically built into the malware so that the same malware has both a structural (code sequence) and semantic (execution path) difference when propagating. Even if a signature is found for one variant of the malware through syntactic or semantic analysis, there is no guarantee that the same signature will work for other variants of the same malware.
Current signature extraction is by manual assessment using semantic information, by string-based syntactic approaches (see [10] [11] [12] [13] for more detail), or by a learning system that is, as yet, unknown. It has been recommended that learning sophisticated language classes, such as context-free or regular grammars, is not preferable from only positive inputs [14] . It is not known what an optimal negative class of virus should be (e.g. viral code with the payload taken out, non-viral programs, arbitrary code, etc.). AVSs have just about kept pace with new variants because of speedy and effective manual extraction of signatures from execution traces. But polymorphic variants, so far, have exhibited low levels of complexity, and growing sophistication of malware writers may soon make this semantic and post-event approach infeasible [8] [9] . In the worst possible case, a different signature may be required for every variant, leading to constant updating of AVS signature libraries and increased time required to scan incoming packets. For these reasons, a "smart" approach to automatic signature generation based on a purely syntactic approach to learning (i.e. an approach that does not require execution traces) is attractive.
A data mining algorithm (i.e. rule induction algorithm) is adopted in this paper to search and extract meaningful and smart information from malware source code in the form of rules which represent patterns (code sequence signatures) in malware data. In particular, a nearest neighbor rule induction algorithm such as NNge (details provided later) may work better in noisy domains such as malware code where there may be obfuscation and deliberate introduction of redundancy. If it is possible to generate a rule-based signature automatically from known polymorphic variants, it may also be possible to automatically create signatures that can detect entirely new variants that have not previously been encountered. If this is the case, future smart AVSs can be "pre-emptive" in that they already know, to some extent, what future variants of a virus may look like based on encountering known variants of that virus. The aim of this paper is to explore this possibility in more detail. One of the issues in applying data mining algorithms to malware data directly is the problem of variable length strings [15] , since most data mining algorithms assume equal length strings. There is surprisingly little work on the application of data mining algorithms to automatic malware signature generation, mainly due to the issue of dealing with variable length strings to detect the critical segments of the malware from which to obtain signatures [16] [17] . The little work that exists in data mining focuses on unusual behavior detection [18] [19] [20] based on semantics. The variable length of malware execution traces makes the application of most data mining algorithms difficult because of the default assumption that strings to be mined are of equal length. On the syntactic front, previous work [16] demonstrated how variable length malware source code could be converted into (much longer) equal length code through insertion and deletion of gaps by performing sequence alignment. However, no attempt was made to input these equal length sequences directly into a data mining algorithm.
The significance of this paper is to continue a purely syntactic exploration of the possibility of generating signatures automatically from malware source code without the need for semantic analysis. Syntactic techniques for signature extraction based on structural detection of malware are relatively unexplored in comparison to semantic techniques (i.e. techniques based on analyzing the execution behavior of malware). The primary benefit with a syntactic or structural technique is that new and previously unknown variants can be generated from the extracted syntactic or structural rules of existing variants (see [13] for more detail). For a semantic approach, an actual variant instance is required so that it can be run to create an execution trace. This execution trace can be compared with other execution traces from previous instances to determine whether a new signature is required and, if so, how effective that signature is in detecting the family of which this instance is a variant. For a syntactic approach, on the other hand, the set of actual instances so far found is a subset of possible instances of the language derivable using a grammar. Effectiveness of signatures can be determined by generating numerous possible instances even if they have not occurred.
Previous work used sequence alignment to extract consensuses (calculated order of the most frequent symbols found in each position) from malware code variants for the purpose of generating the minimum possible number of signatures for detecting those variants and previously unseen variants. But there was no attempt made to make the most of a by-product of the alignment for data mining purposes, which is the output of equal length malware code of variants.
Our task in this paper is to compare signatures produced from the outcomes of data mining the variable length malware code before alignment with the outcomes of data mining the equal length malware code after alignment to determine which method produces better signatures automatically.
Malware is typically a script or program written first in a high-level language (e.g. C, Java) and then compiled into hex code. The source code will contain instructions for the infector part (how to spread), the payload part (what action to take) and methods for encryption/decryption to hide the malware intent. The infector part also usually contains instructions on how to change the code so that new variants are produced on infection. This leads to many "variants" of the same family where the infector and payload are the same but differently coded.
The run-time behavior of the variant is used by human experts to generate signatures (short strings of hex code) for storage in libraries of AVSs to scan incoming packets and the contents of memory to detect the variant and its family.
One of the main problems for AVSs is that polymorphic techniques that change the order of the malware code can evade signatures that assume a constant left-to-right ordering in malware code variants. As will be seen below, some very old and well-known viruses still evade modern AVSs because their variants adopt simple code sequence changes that cannot be detected by the latest signatures.
The task of a syntactic learning system for signature generation of polymorphic malware using hex code only (i.e. no execution traces) is specified below (see Figure 1 ): a) From the code of a set of seen variants P s , automatically generate signatures to identify and detect unseen variants P u , where P s and P u form currently known variants P k .
b) From the code of a set of known variants P k , automatically generate signatures to identify and detect unknown variants P x for cross-validation. In this case, P x are code variants that have not been seen before for either training or testing purposes.
The learning task is to maximize true positive rates, and minimize false positive and false negative rates in both cases above. As will be seen below, previous work has addressed a) through sequence alignment techniques that use insertion operations as well as substitution matrices for matching malware code. It is currently not known whether matching techniques that work well for a) will continue to work well for b), or whether data mining techniques that look for patterns in underlying structure are required to allow generalization to unknown variants.
Roadmap: Section 2 and Section 3 discuss the background and limitations of previous work. Section 4 discusses previous related work relevant to this paper.
Section 5 and Section 6 discuss the data mining technique and sequence representations adopted in this paper. In Section 7, we describe our systems and methods. Section 8 summarizes the key features and steps by comparing the three different sets of experiments conducted in Section 7. Section 9 discusses the results. That is Section 9-1) compares the data mining results obtained from three different sets of experiments against other related work and Section 9-2) evaluates signatures generated through the three different sets of experiments against state of the art AVS products, and on the detection of JS.Cassandra polymorphic virus and its known and unknown variants. Section 10 and Section 11 contain the discussions and conclusions. The paper concludes with references and Appendix section. Appendix Sections A1-A3 explain the three different sets of experiments (Experiments I-III) that were individually performed with these methods.
Background
A key development in syntactic approaches has been adoption of string-based algorithms in bioinformatics for identifying structural matches in malware code.
Such algorithms do not just look for the presence or absence of characters in specific positions but also manipulate the strings to allow for insertion of characters to expand the number of matching characters. Importantly, the results of such string manipulation are a set of equal length strings from an initial set of variable length strings. Earlier work [21] has demonstrated that string matching and sequence alignment algorithms taken from bioinformatics perform best with biologically represented strings (DNA or protein) rather than non-biological character sets, possibly due to being optimized for chemistry-based mutations between characters. We follow previous approaches in transforming malware code to an appropriate biological string representation before sequence alignment, with transformation of consensuses (i.e., those parts of the malware strings that are common) back to hexadecimal (hex) code for signature generation (see [21] for more detail).
A sequence-based method to signature extraction was previously proposed and illustrated utilizing the Smith-Waterman algorithm (SWA) without gap penalties [10] . The method adopted in [10] was further fine-tuned [11] were then mined using PRISM to find underlying patterns, resulting in meta-signatures. Another relevant enhancement in syntactic methods was also recently published [12] . Two different dynamic programming techniques, namely, Needleman-Wunsch and SWA, were explored for matching purposes, and it was found that SWA gave the best results with 100% of unseen P u variants in the test set P k being detected. Recent work [13] adopted ten different combinations of gap open and gap extend penalties in conjunction with dynamic programming.
It was found that changes in these parameters helped to generate effective signatures for detecting unseen P u (test set P k ) polymorphic variants.
Limitations of Previous Work
Previous work using a sequence alignment approach [10] A second limitation, as noted above, was that the alignment using SWA was "pairwise" and only allowed alignment of two viral sequences at a time in the first round of alignment. Multiple sequence alignment was then used on all pairwise consensuses to generate equal length sequences for rule-based data mining using PRISM. However, in the first round, only those regions of similarity in the 
Related Work
The main body of research over the last fifteen years has concentrated on malware detection adopting semantic-based approaches and only a few adopting syntactic-based approaches. A list of approaches to automatic signature generation is presented in Table 1 . Practically all previous approaches deal with only a restricted set of variants belonging to the same malware family and it is currently not known how generalizable these approaches are for detecting other variants of the same family, either unseen (P u ) or unknown (P x ). In our approach, new P u and previously unknown P x structural variants belonging to the JS.Cassandra polymorphic viral family are provided by one of the most respected grey hat hackers.
Some other related and selected previous work that primarily focuses on malware detection using data mining and bioinformatics approaches are shown in Table 2 . Very little research has been undertaken using data mining and bioinformatics approaches for the detection of polymorphic virus and its unseen P u Polymorphic worms
Syntactic and Semantic
Detection of many polymorphic worms and uses intrusion detection techniques such as sliding window schemes and instruction semantics.
Wurzinger et al. [37] Botnets Semantic
Detects botnets that are under the influence of botmaster (malicious body) using network signatures by examining the response from a compromised host to a received command and by generating detection models.
Botzilla [38] Malware binaries Semantic Produces signatures for the malicious activities (traffic) created by a malware binary executed several times within a controlled domain.
Zhao et al. [39] General malware datasets
Semantic
Generates signatures through an inverse transcoding method by converting the malware sequential information, such as system call sequences, propagation dataflow, etc. into amino acid sequences and then aligning them using multiple sequence alignment tool.
ProVex [40] Botnets Semantic
Generates signatures to detect botnets that use encrypted command and control (C & C) systems after being given the keys and decryption routine employed by the malware be derived using binary code reuse strategy.
FIRMA [41] Botnets Semantic Detects C & C systems but does not produce signatures for those.
Ki et al. [42] Worms, Trojans, etc. Semantic
Generates sequences that are typical API call sequence motifs of malicious activities belonging to several malware samples and employed multiple sequence alignment tool to align those malware samples to extract signatures.
MalGene [43] Evasive malware samples Semantic
Uses sequence alignment techniques on two sequences of system call events belonging to two different analysis environments: one environment in which the malware evades the AVS, and the other in which it exhibits the malicious activities. These events are used to construct an "evasion signature" using sequence alignment. Table 2 . Some related and selected previous work in malware detection using data mining and bioinformatics approaches. Previous use of sequence alignment and data mining has for the most part been semantic in nature, depending on system behavior patterns or using n-grams of bytes instead of code or structural patterns for the detection of malware. Also, because of their semantic nature, the generalizability of the results to new P u variants generated through polymorphism is unknown. A purely syntactic-oriented approach, on the other hand, is based on the intuition that most new P u (polymorphic) variants are simple syntactic variations of existing versions. The complicating aspect is variable length variations. The "expressive power" of signatures can be estimated by detecting how well these signatures generalize to unseen P u and unknown P x variants of the same family, all obtained through polymorphic (structural) alterations to the code. The benefit of a syntactic approach is that no semantics is needed. More importantly, as will be shown below, the number of malware training instances required to extract signatures for use against unseen P u test instances is exceptionally small given the sequence alignment and data mining approaches adopted in the experiments.
Data Mining
Previous work [11] used PRISM on the consensuses derived after two rounds of alignment to generate rule-based signatures by performing several train/test (P s /P u ) iterations with an overall accuracy of 62%. Although PRISM and NNge are both rule induction algorithms, the theoretical advantages of choosing NNge over PRISM are due to its potential for improved accuracy and production of extensive or verbose rules. Optimizing rules to produce minimal redundancy is counter-productive in malware signature generation, especially when trying to deal with P x instances and to keep false positive and negative rates low. Moreover, in NNge, frequent removal of data instances and restoration of the training dataset are not required unlike in PRISM. These steps are overcome in NNge by joining the instances to its nearest neighbour (more details below).
As an instance of a polymorphic string-based technique, consider the structu- The cat saw the mouse (Class 1)
The mouse was seen by the cat (Class 2)
We see that the cat saw the mouse (Class 1)
We see that the mouse was seen by the cat (Class 2)
PRISM and NNge were applied on the four structurally-related set of sequences by categorizing them into two classes, namely: Class 1-cat saw the mouse and Class 2-mouse was seen by the cat. The variable length strings were converted into equal length strings by expanding the shorter strings to have a length equal to the longest string by adding the letter "x" at the end of each short string.
PRISM gave the following rules with 75% accuracy after four iterations ("pos" Class 1: the we cat see saw that the cat mouse saw the mouse Class 2: the we mouse see was that the seen mouse by the was cat seen by the cat
The results on this example string set show that NNge can generate rules with 100% accuracy over PRISM, which generated rules with 75% accuracy. One of the aims of this paper is to determine whether this result is generalizable to many more instances of strings (variants) belonging to different classes (families).
NNge, first introduced by Martin (1995) , is a nearest neighbor algorithm and an expansion of Nge [46] , which generalizes by merging exemplars [47] and forming hyperrectangles in feature space that represent conjunction rules (if-then rules) with internal disjunction. The learning is incremental; each ex- class The classification stage is formulated based on the distance D(I, G) between an instance I = (I 1 , I 2 , …, I n ) and a hyperrectangle G as shown in Equation (1) (Classification Stage).
In Equation (1) 
The constant w k signifies weights corresponding to attributes and can be regulated throughout the training procedure [46] 
Sequence Representations
In the experiments that follow, two different types of code representation are tested for data mining using NNge. The first type uses the hex representation and the second uses a DNA version of the hex representation, using the conversion rules as follows:
Conversion of hexadecimal into binary code was accomplished employing the subsequent rules: "1" → "0001"; "2" → "0010"; "3" → "0011"; "4" → "0100"; "5" → "0101"; "6" → "0110"; "7" → "0111"; "8" → "1000"; "9" → "1001"; "0" → "0000"; "a" → "1010"; "b" → "1011"; "c" → "1100"; "d" → "1101"; "e" → "1110"; and "f" → "1111". Successive conversion of the binary code into DNA sequences was accomplished employing the subsequent rules: "00" → "A"; "11" → "T"; "10" → "G"; and "01" → "C".
So, for instance, the hex string "1234567890abcdef" becomes "0001001000110100010101100111100010010000101010111100110111101111" (binary code) and then becomes "ACAGATCACCCGCTGAGCAAGGGTTATCTGTT"
(DNA sequence).
The experiments are intended to check whether data mining using DNA code produces better results than using hex code. Once viral code is converted to DNA code, sequence alignment using publicly validated and provably tested alignment software becomes possible.
Also, in the experiments below, "padding" was required to convert variable length viral strings into equal length strings for two of the experiments (Experiments I and II). For example, given hex strings "13ad3" and "245335623f", pad- 
Systems and Methods
Methods Overview (Experiments I-III): The method in Experiment I consists of six steps, summarized as follows.
Step-1 deals with virus code variant generation P k and separating the training set P s from the test set P u .
Step-2 deals with the process of variable length data mining on a small percentage of the training P s and test P u sets using NNge classifier to generate rules for string extraction.
Step-3 deals with the extraction of common training sequences (i.e. strings, or first-level rule-based consensuses) using the NNge rules.
Step-4 deals with converting the hex code of the training P s and test P u sets (obtained from Step-1) as well as first-level consensuses (obtained from Step-3) into a form (in this case, DNA) acceptable for sequence alignment.
Step-5a deals with the process of pairwise (local) sequence alignment between the first-level consensuses and some variants of the training set P s (both obtained from Step-4) using the SWA to produce equal length sequences (i.e. second-level consensuses).
Step-5b deals with the extraction of meta-signatures, or common substrings, from these second-level consensuses.
Step-6 deals with the conversion of meta-signatures back into viral hex code for the purpose of signature testing against P k and P x viral sets. More details concerning each step are supplied in Figure A1 in the Appendix section.
The method in Experiment II consists of six steps. The same procedure as Experiment I was used along with the same training P s and test P u sets, with the only difference being that some variants of the training set P s were converted into DNA format prior to the process of variable length data mining. More details concerning each step are supplied in Figure A2 in the Appendix section.
The method in Experiment III consists of seven steps. The same procedure as Experiments I and II was adopted and the same training P s and test P u sets were used, with the only difference being an additional step of multiple sequence alignment on the training set P s to produce equal length sequences prior to the process of equal length data mining. More details concerning each step are supplied in Figure A3 in the Appendix section. Table 3 , the length of sequences, and therefore the number of attributes where each position in a sequence represents an attribute value, varies from over 20,000 to over 90,000, making both sequence alignment and data mining heavy computational and memory-intensive tasks. Table 4 presents the results of Experiments I-III and compares those results with the virus detection results presented in previously published works (see Table 2 ). In the case of the work by Chen et al. [16] only the percentages of correctly detected and incorrectly detected instances were reported (as for J48 method) and in the case of Prabha et al. [45] no performance metrics were reported. In the case of Srakaew et al. [18] other overall performance metrics such By adding the letter "x" towards the end of each sequence until all the variable length sequences were of equal lengths.
Comparison of Three Sets of Experiments in Detail

Results
1) Comparison of the Data Mining Results Obtained from Three Sets of Experiments as Well as from Other Related and Selected Previous Work
By adding the letter "X" towards the end of each sequence until all the variable length sequences were of equal lengths.
By the process of multiple sequence alignment. All the gaps introduced by the process of alignment were substituted by "X". Experiments I and III gave results which outperformed those previously reported achieving 100% correctly classified instances and thus 0% incorrectly classified instances (see Table 4 ). Although Experiment II achieved 100% incorrectly classified instances and thus 0% correctly classified instances, the meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) extracted in this experiment successfully detected the JS.Cassandra variants (known P k and unknown P x ). Meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) extracted in Experiment III were the most effective (~62%) of all followed by the meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) extracted in Experiments I (~55%) and II (43%) (see Section 9-2). The fact that the meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) in DNA format performed better if the DNA sequences were aligned prior to rule mining (Experiment III vs. Experiment II) and extraction is also re- Table 5 presents the detection ratio obtained using the meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) generated in Experiments I to III and five current state of the art AVSs. The malicious meta-signatures C1 HEX4 (I), C1 HEX9 (II), and C1 HEX26 (III) [51] . We used "Gary's Hood" online tool [51] as it allows multiple files to be scanned at the same time adopting the four existing AVS products/scanners (i.e. AVG, AntiVir, ClamAV and F-Prot). ESET AVS product was installed on a private machine with Windows based operating system and Clamscan antivirus scanner was installed on a private machine with Linux based (Linux Mint) [52] operating system using their own ClamAV database and using the own generated (.ndb) databases [10] containing the corresponding malicious or non-malicious meta-signature (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ). The databases of all the AVS products were up-to-date with the latest updates. In total, 71 meta-signatures (9 meta-signatures from Experiment I, 14 meta-signatures from Experiment II and 48 meta-signatures from Experiment III) were generated from malicious and non-malicious sequences. All the 71 meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) were scanned/tested against the 352 known (P k ) JS.Cassandra malicious variants, 43 JS.Cassandra non-malicious (P u ) variants and 352 random JavaScript files individually by placing these meta-signatures inside their own generated (.ndb) database [10] . The testing process was conducted using Clamscan antivirus scanner. None of the scans took longer than a second. Table 5 shows the scan results of some of the effective meta-signatures tested against the malicious, non-malicious and random datasets. Non-malicious Table 3 for total number of common meta-signatures).
Malicious C1 HEX4 (I), C1 HEX9 (II), C1 HEX26 (III) along with non-malicious C2 HEX35 (III) and C2 HEX37 (III) were the only five meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) that fully detected all 43 non-malicious (P u ) JS.Cassandra variants. These meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) not only detected 352 malicious (P k ) variants successfully but also detected 43 non-malicious (P u ) variants. As noted in Figure   A1 , non-malicious (P u ) variants still had some polymorphic functions intact inside. All 43 non-malicious (P u ) variants were still executable. The results presented in Table 5 shows that none of the existing AVSs fully detected these non-malicious (P u ) variants as malicious.
The same batch of 71 meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) was once again tested against the 100 unknown (P x ) JS.Cassandra malicious variants by using the own generated (.ndb) database [10] . The testing process was conducted using Clamscan antivirus scanner. The uniqueness of these 100 new (P x ) malware variants was cross-checked by generating a CRC32b hash value for each variant, and no duplicates were found. Table 6 gives the detection ratio obtained by testing the 71 meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) generated in Experiments I to III and two current state of the art AVSs (ClamAV and Bitdefender Total Security 2017) against the 100 new (P x ) JS.Cassandra variants. ClamAV and Bitdefender Total Security 2017 AVSs had overall accuracies of 85% and 0%, respectively, and meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) from Experiments I-III using Clamscan had overall accuracies of 100%, across all three experiments (see Table   6 ). Table 6 shows that all 100 (accuracy of 100%) JS.Cassandra unknown (P x ) variants were successfully detected by the Clamscan using the .ndb database augmented with our meta-signatures. 
Discussions
It was found from the experiments conducted in this paper that Experiment III (equal length data mining technique) gave the highest number of successful me- meta-signatures-44.44% malicious (4/9) and 22.22% non-malicious (2/9)) detected seen (P s ) and unseen (P u ) variants belonging to malicious and non-malicious groups (see Table 5 ). And seven out of the 14 meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) generated from Experiment II (i.e. 50% meta-signatures-28.57% malicious (4/14) and 21.43% non-malicious (3/14)) detected seen (P s ) and unseen (P u ) variants belonging to malicious and non-malicious groups (see Table 5 ). Addi- non-malicious (15/48)) detected seen (P s ) and unseen (P u ) variants belonging to malicious and non-malicious groups (see Table 5 ). Only 11 out of the 30 effective meta-signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) obtained from Experiment III are shown in Table 5 .
As Experiments I and II were performed using two different representational 1) Previous work adopted left-to-right string matching techniques to find the most optimally-conserved meta-signatures. The work presented in this paper adopts a rule-based or top-down approach that attempts to find underlying patterns.
2) Previous work generated equal length consensuses using sequence alignment techniques, whereas the current work generates variable length consensuses adopting a variable length data mining technique (NNge).
3) Previous work adopted pairwise alignment techniques for extracting signatures which only allowed alignment of two viral sequences at a time taking into account only the information available in the sequence pair. This work allows all sequences to be used to extract signatures and so takes into account all the information in all the sequences at the same time, including both family generic and variant specific information.
Conclusions
In this paper, some of the limitations (discussed in Section 3) of previous work [10] [11] [12] [13] were addressed. The learning task of maximizing true positive rates and minimizing false positive and false negative rates was satisfied. A syntactic approach was investigated and three sets of experiments were conducted which involved various approaches to automatic signature generation using the NNge classifier to generate rules that distinguish between malicious and non-malicious files. The results show that this string-based syntactic approach using an NNge rule generation and subsequent extraction and sequence alignment using SWA can successfully generate signatures (C1 HEX and C2 HEX ) which are capable of detecting the known (P k ) (i.e. seen and unseen) as well as unknown (P x ) polymorphic variants of the JS.Cassandra virus (see Table 5 , Table 6 and Figure 2 ). Remarkably, this research demonstrated that it is possible to detect seen (P s ) (training set), unseen (P u ) (test set) as well as unknown (P x ) variants using the training signatures obtained from a very small proportion (typically 3% and below) of training variants of that test family. A minimal number of training variants was deliberately chosen because the need to detect large numbers of test variants from a minimal number of training variants accurately represents the syntactic malware signature generation approach in the real world.
The use of newly generated novel (P x ) variants differentiates our approach from all previous research that adopts existing malware samples from an online repository. In comparison to the semantic-based approaches as shown in In conclusion, the contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
1) Adopting a data mining algorithm, NNge, to generate rule-based signatures automatically from real malware data.
2) Comparing variable length data mining algorithm to equal length data mining algorithm using NNge on malware source code by conducting three different experiments (Experiments I-III).
3) Distinguishing malicious variants from non-malicious with the help of rules generated using the data mining algorithm, NNge.
4)
Testing the derived rule-based signatures against real malware data and comparing the results to other commercial AVSs.
5) Comparing the overall performance metrics such as true positive rate, false positive rate, precision, recall, etc. with other related work on malware detection using data mining algorithms.
6) Detecting known P k (i.e. P s and P u ) and unknown P x variants of a polymorphic malware family using rule-based signatures (see Figure 1 for the distribution of polymorphic malware variants).
More work is required to apply the current rule-based approach to more intricate polymorphic as well as metamorphic viruses. Journal of Information Security riants (P k and P x ) using clamscan scanner. One of the 14 hex meta-signatures, with a sequence length 28, is shown below in hex representation: 28297d0d0a66756e6374696f6e20
A3. Experiment III
This experiment takes a different approach from Experiments I and II to dealing with the need for equal length sequences in order to generate rules using an equal length data mining approach. Multiple sequence alignment is undertaken prior to NNge rule generation to convert the variable length sequences (M DNA and NM DNA ) into equal length sequences (M E and NM E ) by inserting gaps ( Figure A3 ). In
Step-3, a multiple sequence alignment using MAFFT [61] [62]
[63] was conducted on the 22 variable length DNA sequences (M DNA and NM DNA ). The final alignment file had overall sequence identity and similarity percentages of 38.35% and 65.13%, respectively. All the gaps introduced at this stage were substituted by the letter "X". Upper case "X" was added as the DNA sequences were represented in upper cases. Figure A3 . Our method for Experiment III comprising of seven steps.
